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Abstract
Risk analysis has recently emerged as a structured and precise methodology to help modern companies
understand their risks and plan the relative countermeasures well in advance. It is based on a number
of indicators: parameters that quantify the key concepts on which an enterprise designs its security and
safety investments. A modiﬁcator is a function that further modiﬁes an existing indicator, and is itself
an indicator. It is argued here that Risk Analysis can dramatically beneﬁt from three novel modiﬁcators.
One, the Exposure Factor during Critical Time (EFCT), expresses the percentage of loss or damage that
an attack can infer to a time-critical asset. Another one, the Exposure Factor under Retaliation (EFR),
formalises the mitigation to the loss or damage that an attack can infer to an asset when that loss or
damage can be retaliated back onto the attacker. The third one, the Mitigated Risk against Collusion
(MRC), formalises how a security measure can be eﬀective against a single attacker but not necessarily
against a large team of attackers working collaboratively for the same target. Our simulated results ﬁrmly
support the beneﬁts of such augmented Risk Analysis conﬁrming the novel insights it can provide.
Keywords: exposure factor, mitigated risk, time-critical, retaliation, collusion
1 Introduction
There is increasing evidence that it is important to assure an adequate level of
protection to the enterprise’s assets from risks of loss or damage. A variety of
risks exist: some are related to the political and social environment where the
enterprise operates (strategic risks); others concern the money market and interest
rate (ﬁnancial risks); others still pertain to the enterprises’s business processes
(operative risks). Therefore, security has become one of the chief entries in the
enterprise’s investment plan.
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Risk Management is a structured process prescribing three phases: Risk As-
sessment, Risk Analysis, and Risk Mitigation. As it is intuitive, the possible vul-
nerabilities must be ﬁrst identiﬁed and described. Then, they should be analysed
using mathematical methods, and ﬁnally they ought to be mitigated. Mitigation
consists in increasing the security managers’ awareness of the risks and suggesting
them a set of reasonable countermeasures capable of bringing the overall risk below
an acceptable threshold.
This paper concentrates on Risk Analysis and precisely on Security Risk Analy-
sis [12]. It is important to premise that a security threat is not necessarily successful
in general, namely it will not accomplish its intended security breach with absolute
certainty. However, Risk Analysis generally is an anticipated study of the conse-
quences of successful threats. Therefore, the threats mentioned in the following
are always assumed to succeed with total probability, and hence can be considered
actual breaches.
Our contribution to Risk Analysis is the deﬁnition and demonstration of three
unpublished modiﬁcators pertaining to three more and more stringent risks: time-
criticality, retaliation and collusion.
A variety of assets are time-critical in the sense that exposing them to the
risks of loss or damage may have diﬀerent consequences depending on when they
are exposed. For example, this is the case with the heating system or with the
equipment for a public demonstration. There are times when a successful threat to
such an asset will not raise much of the enterprise’s concern. The Risk Analysis of
time-critical assets exactly demands some account for time-criticality, which we will
provide by the Exposure Factor during Critical Time.
The second modiﬁcator deals with the delicate issue of retaliation. No attack
comes without consequences. Social engineering teaches us that a signiﬁcant chance
of retaliation raised by an attack may prevent the attack from happening in the ﬁrst
place. Any rational attacker will balance gains to risks. It follows that, if a damage
can be retaliated, then it is not as problematic as it would have been without the
chance of retaliation. In consequence, such a chance must be explicitly considered
in a realistic Risk Analysis, as our Exposure Factor under Retaliation does.
The ﬁnal modiﬁcator deals with the concept of collusion of attackers. Physical
security of core assets in an enterprise cannot simplistically assume that the attacker
is a single individual. Collusion of a group of attackers towards the same crime real-
istically is a higher threat against the target asset. It follows that a security measure
eﬀective against a single attacker does not necessarily remain as eﬀective against a
team of colluded attackers. Our modiﬁcator Mitigated Risk against Collusion will
formally enter collusion into the Risk Analysis process.
The structure of this paper is simple: after the introduction of the basic ter-
minology (§2), our original contribution is presented (§3) and some conclusions
are derived (§4). The deﬁnitions are accompanied by simulations supporting the
claim that the new indicators add relevant insights to the analysis that any generic
enterprise may wish to conduct without excessive speciﬁcity.
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2 Preliminaries
The Risk Assessment begins with the identiﬁcation of the relevant assets. An
asset can be seen as any tangible or intangible item that has some value for an
enterprise and therefore needs protection. Once the assets are clearly deﬁned, this
phase produces a report describing threats and vulnerabilities that can harm a
system, and advances putative countermeasures. Following [7,12,5], a threat is the
potential for a threat-source to exercise (by accidental trigger or intentional exploit)
a speciﬁc vulnerability; a vulnerability is a ﬂaw or weakness in system security
procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised
(by accidental trigger or intentional exploit) by an attack and result in a security
breach or a violation of the systems security policy; a countermeasure is a control
that should be implemented in order to reduce the ability for an attacker to leverage
existing system vulnerabilities.
The Risk Analysis should determine the acceptable risk threshold and establish
whether the actual total risk underlies that threshold. These are not simple tasks.
There are no standard methodologies for the process, and often security managers
have to decide among too many alternatives. Usually, two approaches can be taken:
one is qualitative and the other one is quantitative. While the qualitative approach
is based on a relative evaluation of risks, the quantitative approach [10] tries to
give a precise and objective measure of risk. It adopts a number of indicators to
mathematically calculate whether the enterprise’s current risk is acceptable. In-
dicators are mathematical parameters formalizing the key concepts on which the
enterprise intends to design its security and safety investments. The main indicators
are introduced below.
The Risk Mitigation sees the senior management team prioritize, evaluate and
implement the countermeasures recommended by the previous phases. Based on the
risk level presented in the risk assessment report, the implementation actions are
prioritized. Every alternative solution is analyzed calculating the indicators deﬁned
in the analysis phase, and then the most appropriate and cost-eﬀective ones are
selected for actual implementation. When the countermeasures are in place, they
should be practically evaluated.
2.1 The Indicators in the Quantitative Approach to Risk Analysis
Several indicators can be used to help estimate the eﬀectiveness of a security in-
vestment.
The Single Loss Exposure [9] gives a precise measure of how a single threat can
aﬀect or damage an asset. However, since not all threats are equally likely to occur,
this value will be modiﬁed below by considering the frequency of the given threat.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Single Loss Exposure) The Single Loss Exposure (SLE) rep-
resents a measure of an enterprise’s loss from a single threat event and can be
computed by using the following formula:
SLE = AV × EF
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where the Asset Value (AV) [9] is a synthetic measure of the cost of creation, devel-
opment, support, replacement and ownership values of an asset, and the Exposure
Factor (EF) [8] represents a measure of the magnitude of loss or impact on the
value of an asset arising from a threat event, and is expressed as a percentage of
the asset value.
The Annualized Loss Expectancy [9] attempts a ﬁnancial measure of the total
yearly loss or damage due to an asset.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Annualized Loss Expectancy) The Annualized Loss Ex-
pectancy (ALE) is the annually expected ﬁnancial loss of an enterprise that can
be ascribed to a threat and can be computed by using the following formula:
ALE = SLE ×ARO
where the Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO) [9] is a number that represents
the estimated number of annual occurrences of a threat.
It is important to notice that estimating the ARO could be very diﬃcult. It is
usually created upon the likelihood of the event and the number of attackers that
could exploit the given vulnerability. For example, a meteorite damaging the data
center could be estimated to occur only once every 100,000 years and will have an
ARO of 0.000001. In contrast, 100 data entry operators attempting an unauthorized
access attempt could be estimated to occur six times a year per operator and will
have an ARO of 600.
Summarizing the above indicators, SLE (and EF) gives a measure of the damage
of a single threat; the ARO gives the likelihood of a threat to occur in a year; ALE
tries to consider both the likelihood and the damage of each threat. All of the
indicators seen so far do not consider the fact that the enterprise can try to build
some defense for reducing the probability of vulnerability exploitation by attackers
(e.g. implementing some ﬁrewall ﬁltering), or reducing the damage of an attack
(e.g. applying some backup strategies).
The indicator that follows has the opposite property. It is exactly meant to
consider the presence of countermeasures. The Return on security Investment [11]
can be used to provide an economic evaluation of an enterprise’s expenditure in
security. It can help compare alternative investment strategies and evaluate whether
an investment is ﬁnancially justiﬁed.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Return on Investment) The Return on Investment (ROI) in-
dicator can be computed by using the following formula:
ROI =
(ALE ×MR)− CSI
CSI
where MR is the risk mitigated by a countermeasure and represents the eﬀective-
ness of a countermeasure in mitigating the risk of loss deriving from exploiting a
vulnerability (expressed as a numeric value in [0,1]), and CSI is the cost of security
investment that an enterprise must face for implementing a given countermeasure.
If ROI is a positive number, the cost for the investment is ﬁnancially justiﬁed.
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Otherwise, if ROI is zero or a negative number, the investment is not proﬁtable.
3 Three Novel Indicators
This section presents our contribution to Risk Analysis in the form of three un-
published indicators, which precisely are modiﬁcators of existing indicators. It is
clear that innumerable indicators can be deﬁned and exempliﬁed. But they must
be worthwhile in the sense that they are meant to bring forward details that are
worth the while from modern companies’ standpoints. For example, one may wish
to deﬁne an indicator for the number of hinges that a speciﬁc threat will break.
Although this might be meaningful for the Maintenance Oﬃce, it may not always
be entirely worthwhile for the enterprise.
One may naively think that a valuable indicator must not address a microscopic
detail such as the number of broken hinges, and that only macroscopic details are
worthwhile. But this is not at all a theorem. A microscopic indicator may turn out
to be relevant if speciﬁc analyses are being carried out, such as exactly on resistance
of the hinges. The converse example says that the cost of installing stronger hinges is
subsumed by the ROI, which may generically embody a variety of security measures.
It follows that a valuable Risk Analysis tradeoﬀs detail and intelligibleness.
Our modiﬁcators address three major concerns that the industrial world is in-
creasingly having to face day after day. One has to do with assets that are time-
critical (§3.1). Exposing such an asset at speciﬁc, critical times will produce a
diﬀerent damage than at other times. So, the Exposure Factor must be upgraded.
The second modiﬁcator deals with the delicate issue of retaliation (§3.2). In brief,
if a damage can be retaliated, then it is not as problematic as it would have been
without the chance of retaliation. The classic Exposure Factor is upgraded also in
this case. The last parameter deals with attacks performed by a team of colluded
attackers (§3.3). A security measure that is eﬀective against a single attacker is not
necessarily as eﬀective against a team of attackers. The Mitigated Risk must be
upgraded here. The deﬁnition of each modiﬁcator is followed by a table simulating
its use.
Asset AV EF ARO SLE ALE
Demo Machine 5000$ 30% 55% 1500$ 825$
Simulation Infrastructure 30000$ 40% 60% 12000$ 7200$
Researcher’s Machine 3000$ 15% 20% 450$ 90$
Table 1
Demonstrating EFCT and related indicators.
3.1 The Exposure Factor during Critical Time
We have seen above that the EF is related to a threat and an asset. It expresses the
percentage of damage that the threat causes on the asset. However, modern compa-
nies have to face asset exposures under various working circumstances, ranging from
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public presentations to rushes before deadlines. Many assets can be time-critical in
this very sense.
Innumerable examples are easy to advance here, but we only point out three
working examples. A trojan-horse attack to a computer running the ﬁrst public
demonstration of the latest version of an Operating System certainly is more devas-
tating than the same attack in private circumstances. The asset “demo machine” is
time-critical. Along the same lines, an experiment that takes, say, months to com-
plete would have worse consequences if compromised towards its end rather than
towards its beginning. The worse attack might disrupt months of work. The asset
here can be generically described as the “simulation infrastructure”, which might be
a single computer as well as a complex architecture of devices of various nature. It
is easy to derive another example from the academic researchers’ world: one would
rather have his computer infected with malware the day after a deadline than the
day before.
We feel that the EF is insuﬃcient to treat time-critical assets, and advance an
upgraded version that takes into account the criticality of the time instance that is
being considered. This inspires the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (EFCT) The Exposure Factor during Critical Time, EFCT in
brief, expresses the inﬂuence that the criticality of a speciﬁc time instance plays
on the EF as follows:
EFCT = (EF + CTF )− (EF × CTF )
CTF being the Critical Time Factor that expresses the percentage of criticality of
a speciﬁc time instance.
The deﬁnition of EFCT is perhaps easier to interpret in terms of set theory. Let
us think of + as the set union operator, of − as the set diﬀerence operator, and of
× as the set intersection operator. The new indicator takes the two component sets
EF and CTF, unions them and then subtracts their intersection. Intuitively, the
resulting set will not be bigger than the union of two component sets, and will not
be smaller than the bigger of the component sets carved of the smaller component.
It is also clear in numerical terms that the CTF can only increase the EFCT over
the EF. Likewise, we have that the highest CTF raises the EFCT to its top regardless
of the EF. These simple observations underly the following double proposition.
Proposition 3.2
• If CTF = 0, then EFCT = EF .
• If CTF = 1, then EFCT = 1.
The same statement can be trivially rephrased swapping CFT and EF, as in the
following proposition. However, it may exceed intuition that the totality of CTF
ends up into EFCT even if EF is null. It means that even a normally uninteresting
asset becomes problematic if attacked during critical time. It seems more intuitive
that the highest EF produces the highest EFCT regardless of the CTF.
Proposition 3.3
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• If EF = 0, then EFCT = CTF .
• If EF = 1, then EFCT = 1.
The intermediate cases in which none of EF and CTF reach their limits may
turn out to be more relevant. They are exempliﬁed later on in Table 2. However,
prior to the description of the Table, we must observe that all indicators classically
calculated in terms of EF ought to be recalculated in terms of EFCT, producing
versions that are sensitive to the Critical Time Factor.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (AROCT, SLECT, ALECT and ROICT)
• The Annualized Rate of Occurrence during Critical Time, AROCT in brief, is
the rate of occurrence of an attack at a speciﬁc CTF per year.
• The Single Loss Exposure during Critical Time, SLECT in brief, is the cost of a
single attack at a speciﬁc CTF:
SLECT = AV × EFCT
• The Annualized Loss Expectancy during Critical Time, ALECT in brief, is the
cost per year of an attack at a speciﬁc CTF:
ALECT = SLECT ×AROCT
• The Return On Investment against Critical Time, ROICT in brief, is the eco-
nomic return of an enterprise’s investment against an attack mounted at a speciﬁc
CTF:
ROICT =
(ALECT ×MR)−CSI
CSI
We can now move on to describing Table 2. It demonstrates EFCT versus EF
and the consequences upon the related indicators. Our three working examples are
considered for the sake of demonstration.
Let us consider the ﬁrst asset. Its classical EF is some 30% as the demo machine
is not particularly important during normal time periods. But its EFCT goes up
to 96,5% because of the high CTF considered here, as it is for example at time
of a public demonstration. In consequence, the SLECT is much higher than the
SLE, nearly reaching the AV. It can also be seen that the AROCT is much lower
than the ARO because it is assumed that a public demonstration can rely on the
maximum precautions to make things work smoothly. Despite that, the ALECT is
still approximately 50% higher than the ALE.
The second asset is the large simulation infrastructure typically used to conduct
long experiments. The high CTF refers to a time when a very long experiment
is about to terminate. Its inﬂuence on the SLECT is net. It is assumed that the
infrastructure is subject to attacks with a rate of occurrence that is independent of
the CTF. This proceeds from the assumption that always the same set of precautions
is taken through time. This assumption has a major impact on the ALECT, which
is some two and half times the ALE.
Analogous considerations apply to the last asset despite the smaller amounts.
The analysis can be easily continued to study the ROICT with respect to the ROI.
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Asset CTF EFCT AROCT SLECT ALECT
Demo Machine 95% 96,5% 25% 4825$ 1206,25$
Simulation Infrastructure 98% 98,8% 60% 29640$ 17784$
Researcher’s Machine 90% 91,5% 20% 2745$ 549 $
Table 2
Demonstrating EFCT and related indicators.
3.2 The Exposure Factor under Retaliation
A recent analysis standpoint for security issues is that of retaliation [4]. Although it
is certain to be socially rejected at present, retaliation may open new and interesting
perspectives in terms of digital security.
The concept was originally spelled out in the context of security protocols [3].
Two decades of research eﬀorts have been spent to analyse security protocols. Such
analyses would either ﬁnd protocol ﬂaws or prove the protocols immune to attacks.
A number of papers have been published to report on previously unknown protocol
ﬂaws and to often come to the same conclusion: the protocol must be redesigned
because it is ﬂawed.
Modern security economics [1] teaches us that is not always possible in practice
to redesign a security system from scratch even after serious evidence that it is
ﬂawed. The system may already be widely deployed so that the costs of its global
replacement would be prohibitive for any enterprise. An important contribute to
the currently fervid debate is the chance to keep a ﬂawed system in use without
much concern if it is found that the attack can be retaliated.
An attack is always the outcome of a balanced decision between the risks of per-
forming it and the consequent beneﬁts. The chance of retaliation may inﬂuence the
balance favourably — from the legal perspective. Who would infect a competitor’s
computer if the chances of consequently having a room of computers infected by
that competitor were signiﬁcant? Retaliation may in fact be taken as a strategy to
keep a heterogeneous system stable, in a setting where ethical issues unfortunately
seem weary.
Our contribution here is a generalization of the concept of retaliation from the
speciﬁc setting of security protocols to the broad security setting. Industrial espi-
onage, which is a well-known though hardly documented reality, arguably proceeds
on this very paradigm: spy on competitors but never allow them to take advantage
of this espionage. Hence, we feel that the classical EF must be upgraded to consider
attacks on assets that can be retaliated. This inspires the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (EFR) The Exposure Factor under Retaliation, EFR in brief, ex-
presses the inﬂuence that the chance of retaliating an attack to an asset plays on
the EF as follows:
EFR = EF × (1−RF )
RF being the Retaliation Factor that expresses the percentage of retaliation that
can be performed.
Also in this case an interpretation in terms of set theory may help the reader’s
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intuition. The − and × operators can be interpreted routinely as set diﬀerence and
set intersection.
It is interesting to notice in numerical terms that a null RF leaves the EFR
unaltered as EF, whereas the highest RF brings down to null EFR regardless of EF.
These simple observations underly the following double proposition.
Proposition 3.6
• If RF = 0, then EFR = EF .
• If RF = 1, then EFR = 0.
Focusing on EF, it is clear that a null EF causes a null EFR. while the highest
EF leaves EFR entirely dependent on RF, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.7
• If EF = 0, then EFR = 0.
• If EF = 1, then EFR = 1−RF .
The consequences of this proposition are not trivial. The ﬁrst of its statements
says that zero damage entails zero retaliation, as it is intuitive. The second high-
lights that the highest EF and the highest RF together bring the EFR down to null.
Some pondering may convince that this is exactly in the spirit of retaliation. If we
can totally retaliate, then we can get paid back of exactly what was stolen to us.
All indicators normally are conventional percentages and hence range between
0 and 1. However, we can imagine that the right end of the range of RF is open.
It means that retaliation can even double or more the eﬀects of the action that
induced it in the ﬁrst place. Interestingly enough, an EF of 1 and an RF of 2 will
produce and EFR of −1 which in fact expresses a beneﬁt for the entity that was
originally attacked but then retaliated back.
As done in the previous section, all indicators relying on EF can be easily refor-
mulated to rely on EFR, as stated in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.8 (AROR, SLER, ALER and ROIR)
• The Annualized Rate of Occurrence with Retaliation, AROR in brief, is the rate
of occurrence per year of an attack that can be retaliated.
• The Single Loss Exposure with Retaliation, SLER in brief, is the cost of a single
attack that can be retaliated:
SLER = AV × EFR
• The Annualized Loss Expectancy with Retaliation, ALER in brief, is the cost per
year of an attack that can be retaliated:
ALER = SLER×AROR
• The Return On Investment with Retaliation, ROIR in brief, is the economic return
of an enterprise’s investment against an attack that can be retaliated:
ROIR =
(ALER ×MR)− CSI
CSI
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It can be seen that a very small ALER, namely a negative number actually
expressing a beneﬁt for the attacked enterprise, would produce a negative ROIR.
Not only would this be an indication that a security investment is inconvenient,
but it would also express the paradox that the enterprise rather beneﬁts from being
attacked and then retaliating. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time
that negative versus positive outcomes are accounted for in the context of Risk
Analysis.
It is interesting to describe Table 3. It is assumed that an attack on the ﬁrst
asset has a small chance of retaliation, 25%. This moderately diﬀerentiates the
EFR from the EF. A similar minor diﬀerence hence appears between the SLE and
the SLER. The AROR, which is only 15%, is assumed to be much lower than the
ARO because an attack that can be retaliated is better than one that cannot be
and hence pessimistically considered rarer. This produces a much smaller ALER
than the corresponding ALE. Such a conclusion might seem positive but in fact is
not. It is merely due to the smaller AROR and not to the beneﬁts of retaliation.
These are better reﬂected by the SLER.
The second asset sees a similarly low retaliation factor but no variation between
ARO and AROR. With this very static asset, it is reasonable to assume that attacks
that can be retaliated occur at the same rate as attacks that cannot. This is in
contrast with the ﬁrst asset. The same considerations made for the ﬁrst asset apply
to the SLER and to the AROR here.
The third asset gains interest in this Table. It is assumed that when the single
researcher’s machine is attacked, the researcher has suﬃcient knowledge to learn
and do the same back to its attacker. He might even most realistically improve the
attack methodology, as the current statistics conﬁrm. Here comes an RF of 130%,
producing a negative EFR, precisely of −4, 5%. The negative SLER signiﬁes that
the researcher that was originally attacked will actually proﬁt 135$ from attacking
back! The negative ALER also reﬂects this setting. Because the MR and the CSI are
never negative, the negative ALER produces a negative ROIR. It is a clear indication
that any security investment to prevent the attack is technically inconvenient: the
researcher beneﬁts from being attacked and then attacking back.
Asset RF EFR AROR SLER ALER
Demo Machine 25% 23% 15% 1150$ 172,5$
Simulation Infrastructure 25% 30% 60% 9000$ 5400$
Researcher’s Machine 130% -4,5% 20% -135$ -27 $
Table 3
Demonstrating EFR and related indicators.
3.3 The Mitigated Risk against Collusion
Facing a single attacker is not generally the same as facing a team of attackers work-
ing for the same illegal purpose. Researchers in computer security have considered
this issue determinant ever since the 1970s. A security measure may withstand an
attacker but fail to resist another one. Therefore, any security statement is strongly
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dependent on the kind of attacker that is assumed to operate.
A milestone in this area of research is the work of Dolev and Yao [6]. They
advance a formal account for the threats against computer security and come to the
brilliant conclusion that any set of colluding attackers is functionally equivalent to
a single super-potent attacker. Equivalence here means that any illegal operation
that the set of attackers can accomplish, also the single super-potent attacker can
do.
Remarkably, this model of attacker has been adopted by researchers in com-
puter security for some two decades. However, its age is starting to show [2], as
collusion against computer security is not always necessary or desired at present.
Oﬀensive skills have become easy and cheap to acquire, so the present setting sees
a large number attackers each working for his own sake. It is worth remarking that
our treatment here is oriented to any security issues that an enterprise must face,
and not to just those in computer security. If it is debateable that the Dolev-Yao
threat model is rather unrealistic for computer security nowadays, it undoubtedly
is entirely inappropriate for general security.
The best example might come from ﬁlm ﬁctions presenting attacks to banks or
casinos performed by teams of colluded robbers. It is clear that a single attacker
would have failed against such a demanding target. Not even surrounding a treasure
with a number of robust steal-alloy doors operated by retina scanners will protect
the treasure from an oﬀending team with the same number of kamikazes plus a
leader. If these examples conﬁrm yet again the importance of setting a threat
model, they also call for a detailed Risk Analysis able to account for the diﬀerences
between one and many colluded attackers.
The Mitigated Risk [5] easily reﬂects the moderation percentage of a security
attack following the adoption of a security measure. This indicator appears to be
too static to both account for mitigation against a single attacker and a team of
attackers. This concern inspires the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.9 (MRC) The Mitigated Risk against Collusion, MRC in brief, ex-
presses the inﬂuence that collusion of attackers plays on the MR as follows:
MRC = MR× (MR− CF )
CF being the Collusion Factor that expresses the percentage of collusion of the
attacker(s).
Identical propositions to 3.6 and 3.7 can be stated here replacing EFR with
MRC, EF with MR, and RF with CF. Similar considerations apply. If CF is null,
then MRC equals MR. Also, if a risk is totally mitigated, that is MR is 1, but CF
is also 1, then MRC goes down to 0. The highest CF expresses a theoretical team
of an inﬁnite number of attackers, which can be imagined to subvert any security
measure 5 .
Following the MRC, also the ROI can be easily augmented as the following
5 Notice that the percentage of collusion of the attackers, CF, depends to the type of applications, protocols
and systems that we consider.
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deﬁnition states.
Deﬁnition 3.10 (ROIC) The Return On Investment against Collusion, ROIC in
brief, is the economic return of an enterprise’s investment against an attack mounted
by one or more colluding attackers:
ROIC =
(ALE ×MRC)− CSI
CSI
Table 4 exempliﬁes the indicators deﬁned in this section. It can be seen that
the MRC of the ﬁrst asset dramatically reduces the MR because of the high CF,
which is realistic because of the importance of the machine. Therefore, while the
ROI is moderately positive, the ROIC is signiﬁcantly negative, expressing the large
diﬀerence between adopting the related security measure against a single attacker or
against a rather large team of colluded attackers (as indicated by CF=45%). This
discrepancy precisely alerts the enterprise against attacks distributed on various,
related fronts. The very security measure that is considered will not be eﬀective
against them.
As a transversal observation, let us consider the fourth column. It shows that
the Cost of Security Investment is always lower than the ALE, as it is sensible. It
is relatively low in case of the second asset. Here, the MRC also is much lower
than the MR but the discrepancy is smaller than in the ﬁrst case. In consequence,
the ROI and ROIC are not as far apart as they were with the ﬁrst asset, although
they continue to signify that the security measure is only eﬀective against a single
attacker.
The third asset shows a high CSI compared to its ALE. The CF is low, as we
are assuming an individual’s networked machine. It can be seen that the MRC only
moderately decreases the MR, and so does the ROIC with the ROI. The related
security measure that is eﬀective against a single attacker still is eﬀective against a
relatively small team of hackers.
Asset CSI CF MR MRC ROI ROIC
Demo Machine 600$ 45% 85% 46,75% 16,87% -35,71%
Simulation Infrastructure 4500$ 35% 75% 45% 20% -22%
Researcher’s Machine 70$ 10% 90% 81% 15,71% 4,14%
Table 4
Demonstrating MRC and related indicators.
4 Conclusion
Risk Analysis perhaps is the main phase of the Risk Management process, as it pro-
vides the mathematical methods to evaluate the risk and decide consequent security
investments. It has gained importance in recent years and lately any medium or
larger enterprise makes some investment in this process.
A variety of indicators are deﬁned in the quantitative approach to Risk Analy-
sis. An important one, the Exposure Factor, expresses the damage that a successful
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threat on an asset causes to the enterprise. Another signiﬁcant indicator, the Mit-
igated Risk, formalises the success of a security measure in withstanding a threat.
This paper has advanced three novel indicators, two of which are modiﬁcators of
the Exposure Factor, and the other one is a modiﬁcator of the Mitigated Risk.
Our Exposure Factor during Critical Time (EFCT) expresses the inﬂuence of
time-criticality on EF. The Exposure Factor against Retaliation (EFR) indicates
how the chance of retaliation can inﬂuence EF. The Mitigated Risk against Collusion
(MRC) formalises the impact of a security measure against a team of colluded
attackers. We have seen simulated results to demonstrate the novel insights that
the three modiﬁcators can bring out.
All fundamental indicators deﬁned in terms of EF, such as SLE and then ALE,
or in terms of MR, such as ROI, have to be redeﬁned in terms of EFCT, EFR and
MRC, producing four sibling sets of indicators if we include the classical ones. In
consequence, an enterprise may calculate the classical set ﬁrst and then our three
augmented sets. An evaluation of eventual discrepancies between related indicators,
such as SLE and SLECT, or ALE and ALER, would conﬁrm that attention must
be paid to the very aspect that the augmented indicator considers, such as time-
criticality or retaliation.
As future work we plan to investigate on acceptable thresholds for the new
indicators we introduce also, we plan to use intervals of value (instead of only a
single) for the indicator (ARO, EF, CFT, RF and CF). Using intervals we can take
in account the uncertainty related to the estimation of the above indicators. Then
we plan to study the eﬀectiveness of our new indicators by testing them in same
real cases.
Our present eﬀort conﬁrms that research in Risk Analysis is strongly motivated
and steadily progressing.
References
[1] Anderson, R., “Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems,” Wiley,
2001.
[2] Bella, G. and S. Bistarelli, Soft constraint programming to analysing security protocols, Theory Pract.
Log. Program. 4 (2004), pp. 545–572.
[3] Bella, G., S. Bistarelli and F. Massacci, A protocol’s life after attacks, in: Proc. of the 11th Security
Protocols Workshop (SPW’03), LNCS 3364 (2005), pp. 3–18.
[4] Bella, G., S. Bistarelli and F. Massacci, Retaliation: Can We Live with Flaws?, in: M. Essaidi
and J. Thomas, editors, Proc. of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Information Security
Assurance and Security (2005).
[5] Bistarelli, S., F. Fioravanti and P. Peretti, Defense trees for economic evaluation of security
investments, in: Proc. of the 1st Int. Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES’06),
The International Dependability Conference: Bridging Theory and Practice (2006), pp. 416–423.
[6] Dolev, D. and A. Yao, On the security of public-key protocols, IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory 2 (1983), pp. 198–208.
[7] Jenkins, B. D., Security Risk Analysis and Management, white paper, Norman Data Defense Systems,
Inc. (1998).
[8] Krause, M. and H. F. Tipton, “Handbook of Information Security Management,” Auerbach
Publications, 1999.
G. Bella et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 207–220 219
[9] Krutz, R. L., R. D. Vines and E. M. Stroz, “The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of
Computer Security,” Wiley, 2001.
[10] Meritt, J. W., A Method for Quantitative Risk Analysis, in: Proc. of the 22nd National Information
Systems Security Conference, 1999.
[11] Sonnenreich, W., J. Albanese and B. Stout, Return On Security Investment (ROSI): A Practical
Quantitative Model, in: E. Ferna´ndez-Medina, J. C. Herna´ndez and L. J. Garc´ıa, editors, Security in
Information Systems, Proc. of the 3rd Int. Workshop on Security in Information Systems (WOSIS’05),
In conjunction with ICEIS’05 (2005), pp. 239–252.
[12] Stoneburner, G., A. Goguen and A. Feringa, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems, NIST Special Publication 800–30, NIST (2002).
G. Bella et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 207–220220
